Is the European Monetary Union an Endogenous Currency Area? The Example of the Labor Markets by Herbert S. Buscher & Hubert Gabrisch



























Is the European Monetary Union 
an Endogenous Currency Area? 
The Example of the Labor Markets 
 

































Is the European Monetary Union 
an Endogenous Currency Area? 
The Example of the Labor Markets 
 











IWH  __________________________________________________________________ 
 
IWH-Diskussionspapiere 7/2009  2
Autors:  The Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) 
Kleine Märkerstraße 8, 06108 Halle (Saale) 
  Dr. Hubert Gabrisch 
E-Mail: Hubert.Gabrisch@iwh-halle.de 
Phone: +49 345 77 53-830 
  Dr. Herbert S. Buscher 
E-Mail: Herbert.Buscher@iwh-halle.de 
Phone: +49 345 77 53-770 
 
 
The responsibility for discussion papers lies solely with the individual authors. The views ex-
pressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the IWH. The papers represent preliminary 
work and are circulated to encourage discussion with the author. Citation of the discussion pa-
pers should account for their provisional character; a revised version may be available directly 
from the author. 
 
 
Comments and suggestions on the methods and results presented are welcome. 
 




INSTITUT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG HALLE – IWH 
Prof. Dr. Ulrich Blum (Präsident), Dr. Hubert Gabrisch (Forschungsdirektor) 
Das IWH ist Mitglied der Leibniz-Gemeinschaft 
Hausanschrift: Kleine Märkerstraße 8, 06108 Halle (Saale) 
Postanschrift: Postfach 11 03 61, 06017 Halle (Saale) 
Telefon:    (0345) 77 53-60 
Telefax:    (0345) 77 53-8 20 
Internetadresse:  http://www.iwh-halle.de 
 
  
__________________________________________________________________  IWH 
 
IWH Diskussionspapiere 7/2009  3
Is the European Monetary Union an Endogenous  
Currency Area? The Example of the Labor Markets 
Abstract 
Our study tries to find out whether wage dynamics between Euro member countries be 
came more synchronized through the adoption of the common currency. We calculate 
bivarate correlation coefficients of wage and wage cost dynamics and run a model of 
endogenously induced changes of coefficients, which are explained by other variables 
being also endogenous: trade intensity, sectoral specialization, financial integration. We 
used a panel data structure to allow for cross section weights for country pair observa 
tions. We use instrumental variable regressions in order to disentangle exogenous from 
endogenous influences. We applied these techniques to real and nominal wage dynamics 
and to dynamics of unit labor costs. We found evidence for persistent asymmetries in 
nominal wage formation despite a single currency and monetary policy, responsible for 
diverging unit labor costs and for emerging trade imbalances among the EMU member 
countries.  
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Is the European Monetary Union an Endogenous  
Currency Area? The Example of the Labor Markets 
Zusammenfassung 
Die Studie untersucht, ob sich die Lohndynamik zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten der Euro 
zone infolge der gemeinsamen Währung zu einer höheren Synchronisation hin bewegt 
hat.  Wir  berechnen  bivariate  Korrelationskoeffizienten  der  Lohn   und  Lohnkosten 
dynamik und schätzen ein Modell, in dem die mittleren Werte der Korrelationskoeffi 
zienten auf erklärende Variablen regressiert werden, die selbst wiederum teilweise en 
dogen  sind:  Handelsintensität,  sektorale  Spezialisierung  und  Finanzmarktintegration. 
Auf der Grundlage von Querschnittsdaten für die EMU Länder, die jeweils gewichtet in 
die Regressionsanalyse eingehen, werden IV Schätzungen präsentiert, um das Problem 
der  Endogenität der erklärenden Variablen zu lösen. Dieser Ansatz wird sowohl für die 
Lohndynamik in realen und in nominalen Größen als auch für die Lohnstückkosten 
variable verwendet. Die Ergebnisse verweisen auf persistente Asymmetrien in der no 
minalen  Lohnvariablen  –  trotz  einer  einheitlichen  Währung  und  einer  gemeinsamen 
Geldpolitik –, was als eine der Ursachen für divergierende Lohnstückkosten und wach 
sende Handelsungleichgewichte unter den Staaten der Eurozone angesehen wird. 
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Is the European Monetary Union an Endogenous  
Currency Area? The example of the Labor Markets 
1  Introduction 
We analyze labor cost developments in Euro member states before and after the intro 
duction of the Euro, and ask whether the single European currency will push the mem 
ber countries into more market coordinated (synchronized) wage formation, thereby eas 
ing the asymmetric nature of shocks.1 
Our motivation for such an investigation is that wages, in particular unit labor costs of 
EMU countries diverge since Euro introduction in 1999, indicating a weaker relation be 
tween  wage  and  productivity  developments.  De synchronization  in  wage  dynamics 
might reflect an asymmetric distribution of costs after economically and/or politically 
caused shocks, hence, a shift of competitive positions and current account imbalances 
with different impacts on employment and growth (see European Commission 2006). A 
national government may aggravate the market asymmetry by various tools, among oth 
ers by replacing social taxes through higher indirect taxes or by exerting some pressure 
on tariff negotiations. In a region with several currencies, the nominal and real exchange 
rate corrects for some of the effects of that type of idiosyncratic shock. However, in a 
monetary union, this balancing mechanism does not exist, and the responses might turn 
into a downward competition of wages and wage costs. So it is of interest to ask wheth 
er wage formation is more symmetric or asymmetric in the Euro area. If shocks will be 
symmetrically distributed across the regions, symmetrical policy responses (= no policy 
option) will suffice. But, there were an argument for asymmetric policy responses, if 
shocks  would  be  asymmetrically  distributed.  Asymmetric policy responses include a 
downward competition of wages, which we consider to be one of the most destabilizing 
perspectives of the Euro area. 
Our study is related to the theory of the optimum currency area (OCA), but has a focus 
on the issue whether the conditions of an OCA are endogenous to a common currency 
and single monetary policy. Our approach is different to a strand of the literature, which 
tries to distinguish between long run convergence and short run deviations in unit labor 
costs (see recently: Deutsche Bundesbank 2007; Fischer 2007; Dullien and Fritzsche 
2007). Convergence models are related to growth theory and the underlying real econo 
                                                 
1  The authors gratefully acknowledge the comments made by Stefano Schiavo (Trento), Axel Lindner 
and Ingmar Kumpann (Halle), and Zorica Mladenovic (Belgrade). Special thanks go to Simone Lö 
sel, who provided excellent research assistance.   
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my fundamentals that drive convergence, while the dynamics of an OCA is driven by 
monetary factors. Also, we do not follow microeconomic and institutional approaches, 
which try to model the impact of a common currency on (absolute) flexibility in wage 
formation and labor market institutions on a single national labor market (see, for ex 
ample Soscice and Iversen 2000; Calmfors 2001; Traxler 2002; Holden 2003; Mongelli 
and Vega 2006; Andersen and Seneca 2008). Our study has a macroeconomic approach 
and asks for relative flexibility in inter regional relations.  
For the European Union, the hypothesis of endogenous OCA criteria has been tested in 
many studies, but these studies excluded the labor market. Insofar, our study sets foot on 
a new territory. The political relevance is striking: if an asymmetric distribution of labor 
cost  shocks  would  prevail  or  increase,  the  need  for  national  political  action  would 
emerge in order to compensate for an imbalanced distribution of wage shocks. Our test 
for endogenous EU labor markets is based upon two components: Firstly, we investigate 
bilateral correlation coefficients with respect to synchronization of wage dynamics. Se 
condly, we test whether synchronization/de synchronization is endogenous to the EMU. 
In this model, trade integration, financial market integration and different structures in 
production  serve  as  explanatory  variables  and  are  assumed  to  be  influenced  by  the 
common currency.  
The study is organized as follows: The second section asks what we can learn from the 
relevant theoretical and empirical literature on OCA for our labor market analysis, and 
where are the open questions. The third section presents the variables of our model, de 
scribes how they are calculated, and which data source we exploited. The fourth section 
provides an overview on the calculated correlation coefficients of wage dynamics, after, 
and delivers the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable in our regression model. 
The latter plays an important role for the precise specification of the regression models. 
The fifth section presents the modeling for regressions and the results. The final section 
concludes. We find evidence for a persistent asymmetry in nominal wage formation 
with detrimental implications for the synchronization of unit labor cost dynamics and 
for balanced trade among EMU countries.   
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2  Theory and Empiricism of Endogenous Currency Area 
An OCA is characterized by a set of regions with integrated commodity, capital and la 
bor markets, so that the structures of the regions are sufficiently similar. The conditions 
of optimality should be fulfilled if output/input movements (‘migration’) converge due 
to a high degree of commodity and input factor market integration. The theory of endo 
genous currency area states that quantitative adjustments, hence, factor and commodity 
mobility would be endogenous in the currency union, and asymmetric shocks would be 
come symmetric ones over time. This statement is closely related to the Lucas critique 
(Lucas 1976), which means that a regime shift (in exchange rates or, a currency union) 
will change the behavior of agents.  
But, there are few studies only that deal with the issue of endogenous labor markets in a 
single currency area. The neglect of labor markets is somewhat surprising since influen 
tial early contributions to the OCA literature (Meade 1957; Mundell 1961; Ingram 1973) 
discussed the labor market issue at a prominent place. The neglect of the labor market 
issue in the literature might be explained by the high costs of migration in the EMU 
compared, for example, to the US. Among the few studies, Mann Quirici (2005) esti 
mated a wage function for the United States with various monetary policy regimes since 
1900. He argued, that an increase of the coefficients of the unemployment rate and out 
put dynamics is seen as evidence for endogenous labor market responses. Silva (2005) 
measures endogeneity in the Euro area, applying a convergence regression and standard 
deviations and found no synchronization of wage. The model we are going to test roots 
in another strand of the literature. We argue that commodity and financial flows as well 
as specialization patterns and their possible changes might substitute for lacking cross 
border labor mobility and might lead to a more or less symmetric adjustment of wage 
dynamics. If so, we might conclude that less symmetric adjustment is responsible for di 
vergent wage and labor cost developments in the Euro area. Our model takes the general 
form of  
) ), ( , ( , , , , , , , , τ τ τ τ j i j i j i j i F F S T C C =   (1) 
with  τ , , j i C  as an indicator for synchronization of any type of macroeconomic aggregate 
changes (output, prices, wages) in a bilateral context of a country i and a country j over 
the period τ, T stands for the bilateral trade intensity. S is the specialization variable, 
which is a function of financial integration, and F ist the financial integration variable, 
which may impact indirectly (via specialization) and/or direction on the dependent vari 
able. This research approach merges two important advances in research:  
In their seminal work, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) provided a new methodology to 
disentangle short term shock disturbances on prices and output from long run adjust 
ments in a currency area. Since then, the measure of symmetric shock responses C is the  
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correlation coefficient of de trended level aggregates, usually output. The authors com 
pared US and European business cycles with respect to various demand and supply 
shocks and found (i) the US regional framework to be more flexible than the European 
Union, and (ii) core European Union to be more flexible than periphery Union (South 
ern member countries). Authors became skeptical about the introduction of a common 
currency in the EU for all countries before the necessary pre requisites were established. 
The single European currency might push the member countries into a more specialized 
economic structure, thereby magnifying the asymmetric nature of (demand) shocks (Ba 
sevi 1993). This was in line with Krugman (1993), who argued that regions should not 
form  a  common  currency  area  if  they  differed  largely  in  sector  or  product  patterns  
(= large differences in per capita income).  
Frankel and Rose (1998) argued that optimum conditions must not be fulfilled ex ante 
but emerge ex post under the influence of the common currency and single monetary 
policy. They tested an empirical model with the correlation coefficient of de trended dy 
namics of economic activity (GDP, industrial output, employment, unemployment) as 
dependent variable, and trade intensity T as explanatory variable for OECD countries. 
Both variables are endogenous in a currency area. The common currency and single 
monetary policy reduce transactions costs in trade, increase the bilateral flows of com 
modities and synchronizes the business cycles of the involved regions. Hence, trade in 
tensity stands for quantitative adjustment of commodity markets, and changes in intensi 
ty for changes in the speed of adjustment. To obtain a clear picture of the dynamics, they 
performed the tests for several periods of European integration. The coefficient to the 
trade variable should be positive in regressions, if the regions form a currency union or, 
at least, cooperate closely in monetary policy. Then, quantitative adjustments should 
gain momentum. Further, a positive coefficient would reflect the absence of industry 
specific shocks, prevalent in case of inter industry specialization (reflecting Krugman’s 
1993 specialization hypothesis). In sum: what they, and many studies of later authors 
did (for an overview, see de Haan et al., 2008), is to estimate whether and how the speed 
of quantitative adjustment (higher commodity market integration) overwhelms asymme 
tric price disturbances over time – while Bayoumi and Eichengreen’s approach tried to 
measure the impact of shocks on output co movements, while quantitative adjustments 
are exogenous. Frankel and Rose found the expected positive signs for trade intensity 
for periods prior to 1998 in regressions with instruments (instruments clear the trade in 
tensity  variable  for  exogenous  determinants  like  distance,  common  border  and  lan 
guage).  
In this study, we transfer the trade intensity argument to the labor market: The higher the 
intensity of trade in similar products, the more present is the labor costs of country i in 
the wage formation process in country j. Hence, the ‘quantitative’ adjustment happens in 
labor market flexibility adjustments inside the regions. If so, we predict a positive sign 
of the coefficient in regressions. This is Hypothesis 1 (H 1), we are going to test. Fur 
ther, we add financial integration and specialization patterns as variable to trade intensi  
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ty, and here, we follow recent studies on output synchronization (Imbs 2004; Schiavo 
2005). On the one side, specialization patterns decide over the transmission of industry 
specific shocks. With high specialization, one would rather expect a de synchronization 
of output (as well as wage dynamics). On the other side, specialization is endogenous in 
the currency area, too, and it is affected by financial integration, which certainly belongs 
to mostly endogenous variables. In fact, the literature concentrates on an indirect link 
through specialization; this is the reason why in Equation (1)  S is described as being a 
function of F. Remember that specialization is relevant for the effect of increasing trade 
intensity on the synchronization measure. This hypothesis roots in a strand of literature 
(see Kalemli Oczan et al. 2003 with further references), which states that more risk 
sharing through an increased trade in assets acts like the lifting of trade barriers: coun 
tries can specialize their production according to their comparative advantages. Hence, 
more financial integration leads via more specialization to a de synchronization of out 
put cycles or, as we assume, of wage dynamics via industry specific shocks. This is our 
second hypothesis (H 2) we will test. Two relevant issues emerge: firstly, the hypothesis 
roots in the classical theory of trade. With more intra industry trade, the assumed rela 
tion should not show up in regressions. Secondly, apart from the way through speciali 
zation, we may not exclude a direct link between financial integration and the synchro 
nization  of  macroeconomic  dynamics.  Assume  financial integration to propagate the 
aims of a common macroeconomic policy to a set of countries with formerly divergent 
monetary conditions; formerly divergent inflation rates start to converge. This is the 
third hypothesis (H 3) for testing in this study. If the predicted sign in regressions with 
financial integration appears, the correlation of wage dynamics should reflect the inclu 
sion of the common inflation rate into national price or wage functions, and hence, stand 
for more synchronization. A schematic presentation of the links discussed and hypothe 
sis to test is given in Figure 1.   
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Figure 1:  
The interplay between the common currency and wage dynamics  
 
 
Source:  IWH  
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3  Data and Calculation of Variables  
We investigate bilateral correlation coefficients of labor cost dynamics between 1980 
and 2007. We divide the period into three sub periods in order to find meaningful re 
sults with respect to the various currency regime events and shifts. The first period in 
cludes the years 1981 1989 (European Monetary System with an exchange rate band of 
±2.5%). The second period runs from 1990 until 1997 (including the EMS crisis 1992 
1993, the relaxation of the band width to ±15%, and preparations of countries to fulfil 
ling the convergence criteria). The third period includes the first ten years of the Euro 
currency and of a common monetary policy, starting with 1998 (fixing of exchange 
rates). Insofar, our approach is different to other work that uses dummies for fixed ex 
change rates (Frankel and Rose 1998), or EMU membership (Schiavo 2005). Period 
average  coefficients  include  information  about  lagged  reactions  of  a  country’s wage 
formation to a shock from the partner country. We receive 55 bilateral country pair ob 
servations per period for 11 countries (except Luxembourg): 11*11 = 121, (121 11)/2. 
Correlation coefficients are calculated from Ameco data series base according to three 
concepts: nominal compensation per employee (NCE) in Euro; real compensation per 
employee (RCE) as index, which were transformed into Euro series, and unit labor costs 
(ULC), calculated as nominal wages over productivity. The nominal compensation per 
employee is not restricted to contractual wages, and includes social taxes (employers’ 
contributions). Ameco calculates the number of employees in full time equivalents, as 
far as possible; hence, they also include a good portion of part time work and related 
employment models. The real compensation per employee is used to evaluate the impact 
of different inflation processes in the countries. We assure a similar movement of NCE 
and RCE, if nominal wage shocks cause a reaction in the price level. The Ameco data 
presents real indices calculated by the help of the GDP deflator. We took the log levels 
and calculated the correlation coefficients according to two methods: (i) we took first 
differences and received the annual rates of changes; (ii) we applied the HP filter to ob 
tain the cycle movements in the levels. The former coefficients are used for sensitivity 
checks. The coefficients serve for an inspection of the size and distribution over the 
three sub periods.  
We transformed level data series of labor costs into annual growth rates as well as de 
trended them by applying the HP filter to the original series. Transformations are neces 
sary for two reasons: first, to achieve stationary time series for each country and second, 
to concentrate largely on business cycle or short term fluctuations in the series between 
the countries considered. Using two alternative measures – annual growth rates and HP 
filtered data – is intended to serve as a robustness check with respect to the results ob 
tained in the later steps. For regressions, we follow Otto et al. (2001), who argue that 
correlation coefficients might lead to distortions in regressions for they move in a nar  
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row frame of ±1, while other variables move in the entire frame of real figures. There 
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with  τ ρ , , j i as the original correlation coefficient. In these regressions, we test various va 
riables, which are assumed to have an impact on correlation coefficients. All other va 
riables enter regressions with their log levels. 
We calculate the bilateral trade intensity is according to three concepts, exports, imports 
and total trade: 
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=   (3c) 
The reason for the three concepts is that trade reporting in national statistics differed in 
the past, and even differs under the EU single market to a certain degree. Hence, exports 
of country i to country j are not necessarily the imports of country j from country i. A 
positive sign in regressions confirms Hypothesis H1.  
We calculated the specialization indicator on the basis of the employment shares of 26 
sectors of the STAN data base of OECD as 
∑ − =
k
k j k i j i share share S τ τ τ , , , , , ,   (4) 
with k various sectors. A pair of countries has an identical industrial structure, if the va 
riable takes the value 0. Otherwise, the higher the value is, the larger are the differences 
in structure. If specialization matters, a formerly negative sign to trade intensity in re 
gressions without specialization should turn into the positive in regressions with specia  
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lization, and the specialization variable should obtain a negative sign. This result would 
confirm Hypothesis H 2. Schiavo (2005) constructed an additional specialization indica 
tor, calculating the Herfindahl index for each country and taking the product for each 
country pair. We restricted our approach to the indicator, which seems to be more trans 
parent in its economic content. 
Finally, we include financial market integration into the model. The financial integration 




, , , , ) ( ) ( τ τ τ τ τ j i j i j i sir sir lir lir F − + − =   (5) 
with lir and sir as the long term (10 years T bonds) and short term interest rate (3 
months), respectively. Data were taken from the OECD Main Economic Outlook. A di 
minishing variable signals more financial market integration. Hence, the sign should be 
come positive in regressions with specialization (H 2), and negative in regressions, if 
there is a direct link between specialization and wage dynamics.  
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4  An Overview on Correlation Coefficients and their Quality 
Signs 
This section provides the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable – the bilateral 
correlation coefficients. The data describe first impressions about the changes in wage 
dynamics synchronization and underlying statistical properties. Both will help to reveal 
problems, which will be incorporated into the regression models following in section 
five.  
A simple count of positive and negative correlation coefficients (Table 1) shows for all 
observations (upper panel) that positive correlations prevailed in the first sub period 
(1981 1989). The second sub period reveals a drastic decline of positive correlations, 
which might be explained by the mixed character of that period. The third sub period, 
which is influenced by the common currency, shows a restoration of positive correla 
tions only for unit labor costs (ULC), but not for real and nominal compensation per 
employee (RCE and NCE). More, RCE and NCE positive correlations continued to de 
cline, mainly in the number of significant correlations. 
Table 1:  
The distribution of signs of bilateral correlation coefficients (55 observations; HP filter) 
Signs 






























































(only observations with  0 5 i,j, , τ ρ > ) 
Positive 









































a Significant at a level of at least 10%. 
Source:  Authors‘ calculation, based on Ameco data.  
The  lower  panel  of  Table  1  includes  only  bilateral cases  with  a high correlation of 
( 5 , 0 , , > τ ρ j i  . The results mirror the picture of the upper panel. We checked these result 
against  bilateral  coefficient  coefficients  calculated  with  the  annual  growth  rates  and 
found somewhat different results with respect to the upper panel (Table 1 in the Appen 
dix). Again, the second period presents a picture of declining positive coefficients, how 
ever, the third period a strong recovery. On the other side, significant high correlations  
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repeat our findings with HP de trended data. In sum, we do not obtain a clear picture on 
the path synchronization of wage dynamics took in the entire period.  
The descriptive statistics of the correlation coefficients reveals that for all variables the 
second sub period from 1990 to 1997 comes up with lower means, wider ranges (maxi 
mum – minimum) and correspondingly with higher standard deviations than the two 
other sub periods (Table 2). Furthermore, in two out of three cases the assumption that 
the data are normally distributed has to be rejected (JB statistics) at least at the five per 
cent level of significance. A plot of the logistically transformed correlation coefficients 
(not in logs) shows that there are extreme outliers in the data which are in most cases re 
lated to the Netherlands and the corresponding bivariate correlations (Figure 2).  
Table 2:  
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables (logistically transformed bilateral corre 
lation coefficients, calculations are based on HP filtered data)
a 
  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Standard 































































































































a Bivariate correlations of transformed correlation coefficients based on annual growth rates (the exercise with HP fil 
ter coefficients produced similar results)***, (**), (*) indicates significance at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Cursive fi 
gures are related to the dataset with Netherlands excluded. 
Source:  Own calculations.  
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Figure 2: 
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Source:  Own calculation. 
Compared with the other data, NCE97 (second sub period) shows that there is a large 
outlier in the series, being six times larger than the other values. And even more pro 
nounced is the picture for ULC97. In most of these cases we are concerned with a trans 
formed  correlation  coefficient  between  the  Netherlands  and  another  country.  Taking 
logs of the data of course dampens the effects of outliers, but the problem is only less 
pronounced instead of solved. In lack of a convincing explanation of this fact, we might 
estimate our equations with the Netherlands included in the dataset as well as with the 
Netherlands excluded, which results in a loss of ten observations for each sub period. 
Another option is the use of a specific dummy for all bilateral observations with the 
Netherlands. 
Table 3:   
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Correlation matrix of the dependent variable sets (all variables are in logs)2 



















1980 89     .227   .014  .899***  .073   .028  .900***  .134   .043 
NCE 
1990 97  .320**     .058  .150  .772***  .127  .197  .895***  .140 
NCE 
1998 07  .023  .021      .169  .096  .095   .157  .014  .329** 
RCE 
1980 89  .892***  .201   .120      .014  .046  .904***  .057   .177 
RCE 
1990 97  .194  .822***  .078  .060     .229  .059  .847***  .212 
RCE 
1998 07   .123   .081  .103  .029   .042      .034  .120  .202 
ULC 
1980 89  .919***  .243*   .055  .883***  .138   .092     .093   .038 
ULC 
1990 97  .298**  .904***  .055  .188  .874***   .095  .226*     .186 
ULC 
1998 07   .010  .220  .376***   .189  .281**  .035   .010  .252*    
Recursive figures (upper right part of the matrix) relate to the correlations with The Netherlands excluded, in the lower 
part of the table the Netherlands are included. *, **, *** means significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The table reveals the 
results for the data in annual growth rates. Results for HP filtered data do not show a different pattern and are available 
from the authors upon request. 
Source:  Own calculation. 
Finally, we are interested to find out (a) whether the dependent variables RCE, NCE and 
ULC are correlated to each other for a given period, and (b) between periods. We obtain 
information about the robustness of regression results with one of the wage concepts 
are, and information about the appropriateness of our sub period definitions. Bivariate 
correlation coefficients were calculated including and excluding the Netherlands. The 
upper right part of Table 3 reports data including the Netherlands, and the lower left part 
excluding the Netherlands. Out of the 36 bivariate correlations in the upper right part, 
only seven coefficients are statistically different from zero. And in all of these seven 
cases,  the  correlations  are  significant  between  the  different  labor  market  variables, 
hence, NCE (1980 89) is correlated with RCE and ULC of the same period at a 1% level 
of significance. The same holds more or less for the other two sub periods. Hence, we 
may expect regressions to yield similar results for all three concepts of wages. Further, 
there is no correlation between NCE (RCE, ULC) of a certain period and the same vari 
able of the other two sub periods. This perhaps may be interpreted as a first indication 
that the data in the three sub periods exhibit completely different behavioral patterns, 
and we may conclude that we defined the sub periods appropriately. 
                                                 
2  Detailed descriptive data analyses for the HP filtered dataset are available from the authors upon re 
quest.  
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5  Estimating and Testing Different Hypotheses on Labor Cost 
Behavior and Trade 
In regressions the Hodrick Prescott filtered (HP filtered) logs of the data are used. This 
is a common way to achieve stationarity whereas annual growth rates are always a com 
bination of cyclical movements (due to business cycle developments and additional ran 
dom effects) and of the secular growth path of the economy. The first differences of the 
logs of the data series are used for robustness checks and reported at the end of this sec 
tion. 
We decided to prefer a panel structure of the data against a cross section approach, since 
the panel structure allows for using cross section weights in regressions. Cross section 
weights seem to be important, for we work with very different country pairs (for exam 
ple, German Greece, France Italy). All the estimation results we present in the set of 
Tables hereafter include the Netherlands. Regressions without country pairs with the 
Netherlands were used for robustness tests, and their results are reported in the appen 
dix. 
We start with testing Hypothesis H 1, i.e., more trade leads to more synchronization of 
wage  dynamics,  estimating  bivariate  regressions  with  Instrument  Variables  (IV).  IV 
serves to clear trade intensity from exogenous influences. We used lagged values of the 
explanatory variables as instruments and the distance measure as well as a dummy vari 
able indicating a joint border or not (known from gravity approaches to trade). The re 
sults are displayed in Table 1. Estimation results confirm H 1 for RCE and ULC, but not 
for NCE with respect to the euro area sub period of 1998 2007 (Table 1). While for 
RCE and ULC the impact of trade intensity on wage dynamics is positive and statistical 
ly significant from zero at the 1% level, the impact on NCE changed from a positive to a 
negative sign between the two sub periods considered. But the impact is considerably 
higher in the period 1990 to 1997 than in the last period ranging from 1998 to 2007. 
Furthermore, export intensity seems to perform better than the other two selected meas 
ures of trade intensity, imports or total trade. Comparable results are obtained if total 
trade is used instead of exports. But for the import variable we obtain mixed results, es 
pecially if emphasis is put on ULC. OLS estimations (see Table A2 in the appendix) 
yield a similar result with minor deviations on regressions with import intensity. But 
here, we find a change of a minus sign in the first sub period of 1980 1989 to a positive 
sign in the subsequent periods for exports and total trade. Hence, we assume the confir 
mation of H 1 as robust. We explain the different results for nominal and real wage dy 
namics with inflation differentials between the countries, which are relevant for nominal 
wage formation, but not for real wage formation: nominal wage formation seems to be 
linked to inflation. Below, we will try to find out whether it is national inflation or rather 
Euro area inflation. With respect to ULC we might conclude that a higher trade intensity 
contributes to the transfer of productivity achievements from one country to the other,  
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and nominal wage formation does not only reflect the inflation rate but also productivity 
progress (assuming the usual wage function approach).  
Table 4:  
Instrumental variable estimates of relationships between selected wage variables and 
trade intensity measures, N = 55, HP filtered data 
 
HP_Log(RCE)  HP_Log(NCE)  HP_Log(ULC) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007 
Log(x)  0.551***  0.380***  0.634***  0.073***  0.602***  0.434*** 
Adj. R2  0.577  0.773  0.945  0.302  0.511  0.797 
             
Log(m)  0.774***  0.087***  0.721***   0.102***  0.930***  0.357*** 
Adj. R2  0.997  0.298  0.763  0.279  0.962  0.891 
             
Log(tt)  0.739***  0.247***  0.793***   0.004  0.914***  0.478*** 
Adj. R2  0.683  0.823  0.812  0.000  0.733  0.769 
Constant term is not reported. For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. ***, (**), (*) 
= significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: the distance measure and the dummy variable indicating a 
joint border or not, the dummy for the Netherlands, constant term., one period lagged explanatory variable. 
Source:  Own calculation. 
Testing Hypothesis H 2 – financial integration affects the synchronization of wage dy 
namics indirectly via changes in the sectoral specialization patterns – we, firstly, esti 
mate the relationship between financial integration and sectoral specialization, and find 
H 2 to be confirmed so far (Table 4). The regression coefficients are positive and signif 
icant at the 1% level for all three sub periods, and the adjusted R
2s report a high expla 
natory power of this relationship. The results are robust, regardless whether we applied 
OLS or IV estimations.   
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Table 5:  
Estimates of the impact of financial integration on sector specialization 
  Constant  Log(FI)  R2(adj.)  Period  Instruments 
1  3.782***  0.078***  0.826  1980 1989  OLS 
2  3.568***  0.140***  0.797  1990 1997  OLS 
3  3.591***  0.120***  0.868  1990 1997  IV: const, log(FI( 1)) 
4  3.568***  0.132***  0.976  1990 1997  IV: const, log(FI( 1)), joint 
border, log(distance) 
5  3.650***  0.059***  0.746  1998 2007  OLS 
6  3.772***  0.139***  0.942  1998 2007  IV: const, log(FI( 1)) 
7  3.782***  0.144***  0.812  1998 2007  IV: const, log(FI( 1)), joint 
border, log(distance) 
*** = significant at the 1% level; OLS = ordinary least squares regression; IV = instrument variable estimation. Esti 
mation with cross section weights. 
Source:  Own calculation. 
Finally, we test Hypotheses H 2 (the ‘second’ step) and H 3 in a combined procedure 
with instrument variables, and relate wage dynamics in real and nominal terms to all 
three variables (trade intensity, specialization, and financial integration). With respect to 
the dynamics of real wages (RCE), Table 6 shows that all trade variables confirm the re 
sults already obtained in H 1 regressions (Table 4). Specialization, however, yields a 
somewhat surprising result: the unique picture is that the regression coefficient takes a 
positive sign, with the variable being significant in most cases. Confirming H 2, howev 
er, would require a negative sign in regressions (due to the construction of the speciali 
zation variable). Differently said, performing the second step of testing H 2, namely re 
lating specialization to real wage dynamics, leads not to the confirmation of H 2, al 
though the first step revealed a strong impact of financial integration on specialization. 
Hence, industry or sector specific shocks do not play an important role for the synchro 
nization or de synchronization of real wage dynamics. With respect to H 3, we find the 
expected negative sign (more financial integration = less interest rate differentials, leads 
to more wage dynamics synchronization) for RCE in both sub periods, significant at a 
level of 1%, however, with declining regression coefficients.   
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Table 6:  
Cross section estimates of real wages, IV estimates  
 
Dependent variable: HP_Log(RCE) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007 
Constant   2.321   8.390***   5.116***   6.779*   3.338**   12.256 
Log(x)  0.674***  0.322***         
Log(m)      0.569***  0.171*     
Log(tt)          0.663***  0.329** 
Log(sp)  1.910***  2.657***  2.582***  2.063**  2.179***  3.746 
Log(fi)   1.007***   0.293***   1.206***   0.241   1.104***   0.350 
R2 adj.  0.889  0.629  0.967  0.688  0.913  0.119 
Nobs  55  55  55  55  55  55 
For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. Least squares estimates with cross section 
weights. ***, (**), (*) = significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: log(distance), common border, 1 
period lagged log(sp), 1 period lagged log(fi), constant. 
Source:  Own calculation. 
With respect to nominal wage dynamics (NCE), we obtain similar results for the trade 
intensity concepts (NCE negative in the third sub period). However, there is not a clear 
pattern of impacts due to specialization and financial integration over time. We find a 
negative sign for specialization in the Euro sub period, that means less specialization 
leads  to  more  nominal  wage  synchronization,  or  differently  said:  industry  specific 
shocks have an impact on nominal wages; hence, a confirmation of H 2. The size of the 
positive regression coefficients is remarkable. With respect to financial integration, we 
find a turn from a minus to a positive sign both sub periods compared (but, the variable 
is significant only in conjunction with exports and imports, but not with total trade). H 3 
is not confirmed for nominal wage dynamics. Nominal wage formation in individual 
EMU countries does not seem to consider the common macroeconomic policy, reflected 
in an average inflation rate for the entire area. This result helps to explain our earlier 
finding, where trade intensity had not the expected sign on nominal wage dynamics (Ta 
ble 1), which we explained with the relevance of country inflation in wage functions. 
Regressions with unit labor costs (ULC) yield similar results for the trade intensity va 
riables (confirming H 1 for exports and total trade in the Euro sub period), but no clear 
picture for the specialization variable. Hence, we cannot confirm H 2. Financial integra 
tion is no longer significant in the third sub period, compared to the pre Euro area pe 
riod, when financial integration significantly contributed to more ULC synchronization.  
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Table 7:  
Cross section estimates of nominal wage per employee (log(nce)), IV estimates 
 
Dependent variable: HP_Log(NCE) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007 
Constant  0.985  11.216***  0.088  5.090***  0.779  5.860** 
Log(x)  0.607***   0.331***         
Log(m)      0.796***   0.160***     
Log(tt)          0.652***   0.219*** 
Log(sp)  0.969***   3.472***  1.420***   1.596***  1.063***   1.893*** 
Log(fi)   1.161***  0.294***   1.043***  0.152***   1.144***  0.144** 
R2 adj.  0.991  0.508  0.939  0.996  0.982  0.402 
Nobs  55  55  55  55  55  55 
For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. Least squares estimates with cross section 
weights. ***, (**), (*) = significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: log(distance), joint border, 1 period 
lagged log(sp), 1 period lagged log(fi), constant. 
Source:  Own calculation. 
Table 8:  
Cross section estimates of unit labor costs (log(ulc)), IV estimates 
  Dependent variable: HP_Log(ULC) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997
a  1998 2007
a 
Constant  0.234   7.466***   1.243*   0.091   0.669   5.603*** 
Log(x)  0.751***  0.725***         
Log(m)      0.893***  0.427***     
Log(tt)          0.940***  0.635*** 
Log(sp)  1.511***  3.000***  1.984***  0.719  1.920***  2.456*** 
Log(fi)   1.407***   0.447***   1.120***   0.072   1.273***   0.241*** 
R2 adj.  0.877  0.934  0.998  0.795  0.892  0.801 
Nobs  55  55  55  55  55  55 
For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. Least squares estimates with cross section 
weights. ***, (**), (*) = significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: log(distance), joint border, 1 period 
lagged log(sp), 1 period lagged log(fi), constant. a) as additional instrument log(tt( 1)) has been used. 
Source:  Own calculations. 
As mentioned in Section 4, the Netherlands should be considered as outlier in the sam 
ple. Therefore, we re estimated the wage and unit labor cost equations with the Nether 
lands excluded. The detailed results can be found in the appendix under Tables A3, A4, 
and A5, corresponding to Tables 6, 7 and 8 above. With respect to the real wage varia 
ble, RCE, the results without the Netherlands are very similar to those reported in the 
text. All signs of the coefficients are the same, and all coefficient estimates declared as  
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significant with the Netherlands included also remain significant without the Dutch data. 
With respect to nominal wage dynamics both tables (Table 7 and A4) differ somewhat 
more in the results, but the overall impression remains the same, namely financial inte 
gration switches in sign across periods and across different trade specifications, and that 
the trade variables show a negative sign in the last sub period. And finally, with respect 
to the unit labor costs, ULC, the results are slightly better with the Netherlands excluded 
from a purely statistical point of view. Especially the impact of financial integration, FI, 
is significant in five out of six regressions without the Netherlands and shows the ex 
pected negative sign, whereas FI is significant only in the period from 1990 to 1997 in 
the case the Netherlands are included. 
A couple of additional regressions were estimated to test the results for robustness. The 
first approach is to check whether estimations with first differences yield similar results. 
Tables in Appendix B present results of all the regressions in the main part. Table B4 
(compare to Table 4) depicts the impact of the trade measures on wages and unit labour 
costs. Most results remain unchanged in their signs as well as in their statistical signifi 
cance. Furthermore, the impact is again higher in the second period than in the third pe 
riod. Also, similar results are obtained for the basic regressions with the trade, speciali 
zation, and financial integration variables (compare Table 6, 7, and 8 and B6, B7, B8). 
The results for real compensation per employee as well as for unit labour costs appear 
even more robust than those obtained for the nominal wage variable. The sign of the fi 
nancial integration variable changes its sign across the periods when nominal compensa 
tion is the endogenous variables, whereas the signs are similar in most cases for the two 
alternative measures. It should be noted that the import variable performs considerably 
worse compared with the export intensity or total trade intensity. 
The second approach is to ask for the impact of the outliers in the data set, in particular 
clustered around the Netherlands. Results given in appendices C and D either drop the 
Netherlands pairs from the sample, leaving a total of 45 observations, or introduce a 
dummy variable to account for the Netherlands case. Comparing the results with the ap 
propriate tables in the main part, we found results not changed too much, with respect to 
the use of first differences as well as for the special treatment of the Netherlands. We 
conclude outliers do not lead to a major distortion of our main findings. Finally, we 
completed these exercises by repeating the tests C and D (first differences) with HP fil 
tered data. The results are reported in the appendices E and F. We did not find any major 
deviation from results with first differences in appendices C and D and, hence, with HP 
filtered data in our basis regressions.   
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6  Conclusion 
We intended to find out how endogenous labor markets in the EMU are by measuring 
their synchronization with wage dynamics. We tested three hypotheses, and found rather 
clear evidence for an impact of trade intensity on the synchronization of real wage and 
unit labor costs dynamics. With respect to real wages, our result is backed by earlier 
studies, which explain the synchronization of economic activities by increasing trade in 
tensity in a currency area. We were particularly interested, how far nominal wage forma 
tion in countries reflect the effects of a common currency and single monetary policy, 
and found that higher trade intensity does not exert such a synchronizing impact. With 
respect to unit labor costs, we conclude that productivity shocks are better distributed 
among the member countries and regions via higher trade, and are included into national 
wage formation. 
Our second intention was to test the hypothesis that financial integration induces more 
specialization across countries and regions and, hence, allows a stronger impact of in 
dustry specific effects on national formation. We found this strong positive impact of 
financial integration on specialization, but not the expected transfer on real wage or unit 
labor cost synchronization. We find more specialization to produce less synchronization 
for nominal wage dynamics only.  
Finally, we found that financial integration explains the synchronization of real wage 
dynamics, but is coupled with a de synchronization of nominal wage dynamics. In sum, 
our tests revealed, that national nominal wage formation is not endogenous in the EMU. 
National wage setters seem to include into the wage function the national inflation rate 
and not the area wide inflation rate, which should emerge through financial integration. 
The policy relevant conclusion is that this behavior constitutes resistant asymmetries in 
labor market institutions and in an asymmetric nominal shock distribution across the 
Euro member countries. Notwithstanding, that different national inflation rates compen 
sate for different nominal wage changes (= synchronized real wage dynamics), this re 
sult might explain the different development of unit labor costs (and trade imbalances) 
in the EMU: we have seen that financial integration, still contributing to synchronization 
of unit labor cost dynamics in the pre Euro area, lost any significance since 1998.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Distribution of correlation coefficients and OLS estimates 
Table A1:  
The distribution of signs of bilateral correlation coefficients (55 observations) – growth rates 
Signs 
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a Significant at a level of at least 10%. 
Source:  Authors‘ calculation, based on Ameco data.   
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Table A2:  
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables (logistically transformed bilateral corre-
lation coefficients, first differenced data)
a 
  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Standard 
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1.126      
0.896      
a Bivariate correlations of transformed correlation coefficients based on annual growth rates. **, (**), (*) indicates 
significance at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Recursive figures are related to the dataset with Netherlands excluded. 
Source:  Own calculation.  
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Figure A2:  
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Source:  Own calculation.  
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Appendix B: Regression results in first differences (  = 55) 
Table B4:  
Instrumental variable estimates of relationships between selected wage variables and 
trade intensity measures 
   Log(RCE)   Log(NCE)   Log(ULC) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007 
Log(x)  0.486***  0.140***  0.374***   0.048***  0.551***  0.220*** 
Adj. R2  0.548       0.825       0.864       0.478       0.855       0.724      
Log(m)  0.546***  0.020*     0.539***   0.080***  0.539***   0.080*** 
Adj. R2  0.822       0.042       0.840       0.905       0.840       0.905      
Log(tt)  0.600***  0.058***  0.562***   0.057***  0.690***  0.197*** 
Adj. R2  0.753       0.895       0.645       0.442       0.747       0.493      
Constant term is not reported. For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. ***, (**), (*) 
= significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: the one period lagged explanatory variable, the distance mea 
sure and the dummy variable indicating a joint border or not. Due to the lagged instruments, only two periods remain 
for estimation. 
Source:  Own calculations. 
Table B6: 
Cross section estimates of real wages, IV estimates  
  Dependent variable:  Log(RCE) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007 
Constant   1.093***   10.241***  0.205        3.791        0.921        9.569*** 
Log(x)  0.536***  0.505***         
Log(m)      0.835***  0.282**     
Log(tt)          0.663***  0.525*** 
Log(sp)  1.302***  3.628***  1.207**   1.602     1.357***  3.505*** 
Log(fi)   0.748***   0.086***   0.292       0.065      0.575***  0.018      
R2 adj.  0.904       0.990       0.877       0.508     0.825       0.746      
Nobs  55       55       55       55     55       55      
For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. Least squares estimates with cross section 
weights. ***, (**), (*) = significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: log(distance), common border, 1 
period lagged log(sp), 1 period lagged log(fi), constant. 
Source:  Own calculations.  
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Table B7:  
Cross section estimates of nominal wage per employee (log(nce)), IV estimates 
  Dependent variable:  Log(NCE) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007 
Constant  1.577       10.369**  2.314       6.673***  1.940       9.481      
Log(ex)  0.228***   0.418***         
Log(im)      0.173        0.252***     
Log(tt)          0.198*      0.498*** 
Log(sp)  0.224        3.146**    0.041        1.974***  0.088        3.069      
Log(fi)   0.847***  0.460**    0.854***  0.333***   0.863***  0.357      
R2 adj.  0.911       0.919       0.887       0.996       0.911       0.379      
Nobs  55       55       55       55       55       55      
For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. Least squares estimates with cross section 
weights. ***, (**), (*) = significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: log(distance), joint border, 1 period 
lagged log(sp), 1 period lagged log(fi), constant. 
Source:  Own calculations. 
Table B8:  
Cross section estimates of unit labor costs (log(ulc)), IV estimates 
  Dependent variable:  Log(ULC) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997
a  1998 2007
a 
Constant  0.266       4.032***  0.010       9.056***   0.575***  1.320**   
Log(ex)  0.304       0.091***         
Log(im)      0.358***   0.256***     
Log(tt)          0.360***  0.211*** 
Log(sp)  0.824***   0.793***  0.929***   2.709***  1.084***  0.116      
Log(fi)   1.085***  0.002        0.986***   0.079       1.032***   0.031      
R2 adj.  0.993       0.865       0.998       0.919       0.981       0.563      
Nobs  55       55       55       55       55       55      
For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. Least squares estimates with cross section 
weights. ***, (**), (*) = significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: log(distance), joint border, 1 period 
lagged log(sp), 1 period lagged log(fi), constant. a) as additional instrument log(tt( 1)) has been used. 
Source:  Own calculations.  
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Appendix C: Regression results in first differences with the  etherlands excluded 
Table C4:  
Instrumental variable estimates of relationships between selected wage variables and 
trade intensity measures, N=45 (The Netherlands excluded) 
   Log(RCE)   Log(NCE)   Log(ULC) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007 
Log(x)  0.320***  0.161***  0.260***   0.098***  0.368***  0.185*** 
Adj. R2  0.513       0.949       0.932       0.969       0.513       0.669      
Log(m)  0.487***  0.087***  0.363***   0.103***  0.535***  0.189*** 
Adj. R2  0.872       0.737       0.656       0.991       0.748       0.664      
Log(tt)  0.514***  0.144***  0.341***   0.106***  0.431***  0.189*** 
Adj. R2  0.895       0.765       0.548       0.997       0.442       0.718      
Constant term is not reported. For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. ***, (**), (*) 
= significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: the one period lagged explanatory variable, the distance mea 
sure and the dummy variable indicating a joint border or not. Due to the lagged instruments, only two periods remain 
for estimation. 
Source:  Own calculations. 
Table C5: 
Estimates of the impact of financial integration on sector specialization (N=45, without 
The Netherlands) 
  Constant  Log(FI)  R2(adj.)  Period  Instruments 
1  3.649***  0.132***  0.504  1980 1989  OLS 
2  3.498***  0.172***    1990 1997  OLS 
3  3.594***  0.118***  0.917  1990 1997  IV: const, log(FI( 1)) 
4  3.619***  0.054***  0.414  1998 2007  OLS 
5  3.753***  0.148***  0.688  1998 2007  IV: const, log(FI( 1)) 
*** = significant at the 1% level; OLS = ordinary least squares regression; IV = instrument variable estimation. Esti 
mation with cross section weights. 
Source:  Own calculations.  
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Table C6:  
Cross section estimates of real wages, IV estimates, The Netherlands excluded  
  Dependent variable:  Log(RCE) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007 
Constant  0.043        9.134***   0.042        1.600       1.210**      7.025*** 
Log(x)  0.624***  0.466***         
Log(m)      0.703***  0.231***     
Log(tt)          0.780***  0.482*** 
Log(sp)  1.025***  3.245***  0.997***  0.958**   0.830***  2.693*** 
Log(fi)   0.468***   0.126**     0.056       0.104**     0.233***   0.089      
R2 adj.  0.826       0.986        0.913       0.695        0.853       0.983      
Nobs  45       45        45       45        45       45      
For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. Least squares estimates with cross section 
weights. ***, (**), (*) = significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: log(distance), common border, 1 
period lagged log(sp), 1 period lagged log(fi), constant. 
Source:  Own calculations. 
Table C7:  
Cross section estimates of nominal wage per employee (log(nce)), IV estimates. The Ne 
therlands excluded 
  Dependent variable:  Log(NCE) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007 
Constant  2.327***  6.411**    2.973**    8.214***  2.447***  6.862**   
Log(ex)  0.266***   0.448***         
Log(im)      0.455***   0.739***     
Log(tt)          0.349***   0.593*** 
Log(sp)   0.056         2.168***   0.071         3.188***   0.028         2.555*** 
Log(fi)   0.426***  0.282         0.186        0.052         0.327***  0.166       
R2 adj.  0.783        0.805        0.571        0.461        0.653        0.668       
Nobs  45        45        45        45        45        45       
For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. Least squares estimates with cross section 
weights. ***, (**), (*) = significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: log(distance), joint border, 1 period 
lagged log(sp), 1 period lagged log(fi), constant. 
Source:  Own calculations.  
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Table C8: 
Cross section estimates of unit labor costs (log(ulc)), IV estimates; The Netherlands ex 
cluded 
  Dependent variable:  Log(ULC) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997
a  1998 2007
a 
Constant  1.538**     4.408***   0.305       3.211*     1.867**     5.173*** 
Log(ex)  0.461***  0.219***         
Log(im)      0.282**    0.137          
Log(tt)          0.392**    0.238*** 
Log(sp)  0.482***  1.657***  0.887***   0.494       0.342**    1.904*** 
Log(fi)   0.623***   0.254***   0.915***   0.000        0.672***   0.272*** 
R2 adj.  0.969       0.997       0.993       0.224       0.924       0.686      
Nobs  45       45       45       45       45       45      
For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. Least squares estimates with cross section 
weights. ***, (**), (*) = significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: log(distance), joint border, 1 period 
lagged log(sp), 1 period lagged log(fi), constant. a) as additional instrument log(tt( 1)) has been used. 
Source:  Own calculations.  
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Appendix D: Regression results in first differences – dummy  etherlands included 
Table D4:  
Instrumental variable estimates of relationships between selected wage variables and 
trade intensity measures 
   Log(RCE)   Log(NCE)   Log(ULC) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007 
Log(x)  0.898***   0.043**    0.778***   0153***  0.962***  0.167*** 
NL dum 
my  0.171        0.243***  0.141         0.005        0.455***   0.135*** 
Adj. R2  0.954        0.844        0.948        0.664        0.994        0.874       
Log(m)  0.992***   0.064***  0.792***   0.176***  0.981***  0.177*** 
NL dum 
my   0.206        0.343***   0.090        0.155***  0.172*       0.270*** 
Adj. R2  0.712        0.634        0.986        0.679        0.981        0.502       
Log(tt)  1.034***   0.043***  0.795***   0.155***  0.996***  0.183*** 
NL dum 
my   0.182        0.271***   0.020        0.044        0.395**     0.212*** 
Adj. R2  0.855        0.924        0.945        0.759        0.966        0.627       
Constant term is not reported. For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. ***, (**), (*) 
= significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: the distance measure and the dummy variable indicating a 
joint border or not, the dummy for the Netherlands, constant term.  
Source:  Own calculations. 
Table D5:  
Estimates of the impact of financial integration on sector specialization 
  Constant  Log(FI)  NL dum  R2(adj.)  Period  Instruments 
1  3.708***  0.098***  0.247***  0.878  1980 1989  OLS 
2  3.541***  0.147***  0.037        0.947  1990 1997  OLS 
3  3.592***  0.121***  0.030        0.791  1990 1997  IV: const, log(FI( 1)), 
NL dum 
4  3.567***  0.132***  0.039***  0.969  1990 1997 
IV: const, log(FI( 1)), joint 
border, log(distance), 
NL dum 
5  3.646***  0.075***  0.094***  0.976  1998 2007  OLS 
6  3.761***  0.158***  0.136***  0.993  1998 2007  IV: const, log(FI( 1)), 
NL dum 
7  3.765***  0.160***  0.135***  0.950  1998 2007 
IV: const, log(FI( 1)), joint 
border, log(distance), 
NL dum 
*** = significant at the 1% level; OLS = ordinary least squares regression; IV = instrument variable estimation. Esti 
mation with cross section weights. 
Source:  Own calculations.  
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Table D6:  
Cross section estimates of real wages, IV estimates  
  Dependent variable:  Log(RCE) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007 
Constant   1.105**     11.719***   1.591        15.088***   0.872        15.324*** 
Log(x)  0.563***  0.484***         
Log(m)      0.707***  0.763***     
Log(tt)          0.689***  0.773*** 
Log(fi)   0.759***   0.161***   0.567**     0.029   0.618***   0.166 
Log(sp)  1.354***  4.011***  1.625***  5.438***  1.410***  5.403*** 
NL dummy   0.164         0.285**   0.167        0.537***   0.272**     0.476*** 
R2 adj.  0.824        0.974       0.765       0.909       0.772       0.925      
Nobs  55       55       55       55       55       55      
For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. Least squares estimates with cross section 
weights. ***, (**), (*) = significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: log(distance), common border, 1 
period lagged log(sp), 1 period lagged log(fi), constant. 
Source:  Own calculations. 
Table D7:  
Cross section estimates of nominal wage per employee (log(nce)), IV estimates 
  Dependent variable:  Log(NCE) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007 
Constant  1.459        15.582***  1.436        17.367***  1.525        15.982*** 
Log(x)  0.272***   0.469***         
Log(m)      0.254**     0.770***     
Log(tt)          0.272***   0.642*** 
Log(fi)   0.828***  0.699**     0.777***  0.392***   0.803***  0.580*** 
Log(sp)  0.333         4.604***  0.320         5.700***  0.312         5.004*** 
NL dummy   0.094        0.733***   0.225        1.078***   0.146        0.934*** 
R2 adj.  0.942        0.629        0.958        0.749        0.946        0.946       
Nobs  55        55        55        55        55        55       
For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. Least squares estimates with cross section 
weights. ***, (**), (*) = significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: log(distance), joint border, 1 period 
lagged log(sp), 1 period lagged log(fi), constant. 
Source:  Own calculations.  
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Table D8:  
Cross section estimates of unit labor costs (log(ulc)), IV estimates 
  Dependent variable:  Log(ULC) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997
a  1998 2007
a 
Constant  0.459        0.581         0.002        2.455***   1.139        3.079       
Log(ex)  0.312**    0.187***         
Log(im)      0.383***  0.192***     
Log(tt)          0.167        0.156*** 
Log(fi)   1.081***   0.102**     0.978***  0.002         1.216***   0.037       
Log(sp)  0.775***  0.276        0.959***   0.194        1.083***   0.453       
NL Dummy  0.015         0.227**     0.124         0.217***  0.001         0.109       
R2 adj.  0.989        0.517        0.985        0.841        0.986        0.857       
Nobs  55        55        55        55        55        55       
For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. Least squares estimates with cross section 
weights. ***, (**), (*) = significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: log(distance), joint border, 1 period 
lagged log(sp), 1 period lagged log(fi), constant. a) as additional instrument log(tt( 1)) has been used. 
Source:  Own calculations.  
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Appendix E: Regression results with HP filtered data, 
 etherlands dummy variable included (  = 55) 
Table E4:  
Instrumental variable estimates of relationships between selected wage variables and 
trade intensity measures, N = 55 
  HP_Log(RCE)  HP_Log(NCE)  HP_Log(ULC) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007 
Log(x)  0.495***  0.350***  0.606***  0.032        0.560***  0.425*** 
NL dum  0.624***  0.241        0.537***  0.622***  0.811***  0.548*** 
Adj. R2  0.792        0.681        0.948        0.400        0.624        0.874       
Log(m)  0.853***  0.086***  0.738***   0.177***  0.902***  0.323*** 
NL dum  0.454        0.178        0.418        0.797***  0.581*     0.549*** 
Adj. R2  0.855        0.412        0.901        0.732        0.747        0.980       
Log(tt)  0.708***  0.207***  0.759***   0.041*     0.823***  0.424*** 
NL dum  0.715**    0.191        0.549        0.659***  0.866**    0.463*** 
Adj. R2  0.932        0.352        0.585        0.418        0.552        0.974       
Constant term is not reported. For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. ***, (**), (*) 
= significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: the distance measure and the dummy variable indicating a 
joint border or not, the dummy for the Netherlands, constant term., one period lagged explanatory variable. 
Source:  Own calculations. 
Table E5:  
Estimates of the impact of financial integration on sector specialization (N=55, dummy 
for The Netherlands) 
  Constant  Log(fi)  Dum_nl  R2(adj.)  Period  Instruments 
1  3.708***  0.098***  0.247***  0.878  1980 1989  OLS 
2  3.541***  0.147***  0.037        0.947  1990 1997  OLS 
3  3.592***  0.121***  0.030        0.791  1990 1997  IV: const, log(FI( 1)) 
4  3.646***  0.075***  0.094***  0.976  1998 2007  OLS 
5  3.761***  0.158***  0.136***  0.993  1998 2007  IV: const, log(FI( 1)) 
*** = significant at the 1% level; OLS = ordinary least squares regression; IV = instrument variable estimation. Esti 
mation with cross section weights. 
Source:  Own calculations.  
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Table E6:  
Cross section estimates of real wages, IV estimates, dummy variable for The Nether 
lands  
  Dependent variable: HP_Log(RCE) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007 
Constant   1.977   8.523***   4.648***   9.685         2.985*      29.496 
Log(x)  0.659***  0.334***         
Log(m)      0.601***  0.394***     
Log(tt)          0.681***  0.419 
Log(sp)  1.805***  2.708***  2.484***  3.206        2.109***  8.419 
Log(fi)   1.010***   0.292**     1.146***   0.151         1.086***   1.192 
Neth dum   0.129         0.271         0.315         0.323         0.286         0.882 
R2 adj.  0.897        0.738        0.905        0.764        0.877        0.000 
Nobs  55        55        55        55        55        55 
For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. Least squares estimates with cross section 
weights. ***, (**), (*) = significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: log(distance), common border, 1 
period lagged log(sp), 1 period lagged log(fi), constant. 
Source:  Own calculations. 
Table E7:  
Cross section estimates of nominal wage per employee (log(nce)), IV estimates, dummy 
for the Netherlands included 
  Dependent variable: HP_Log(NCE) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007 
Constant  1.002*     17.155***   0.171        23.713***  0.754*     17.217*** 
Log(x)  0.609***   0.622***         
Log(m)      0.739***   1.004***     
Log(tt)          0.651***   0.657*** 
Log(sp)  0.975***   5.542***  1.444***   7.984***  1.083***   5.576*** 
Log(fi)   1.175***  0.496***   1.072***  0.432***   1.173***  0.549*** 
Neth_dum   0.031        1.589***   0.006        2.148***   0.037        1.867*** 
R2 adj.  0.979        0.673        0.982        0.864        0.972        0.822       
Nobs  55        55        55        55        55        55       
For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. Least squares estimates with cross section 
weights. ***, (**), (*) = significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: log(distance), joint border, 1 period 
lagged log(sp), 1 period lagged log(fi), constant. 
Source:  Own calculations.  
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Table E8:  
Cross section estimates of unit labor costs (log(ulc)), IV estimates (with dummy for The 
Netherlands) 
  Dependent variable: HP_Log(ULC) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997
a  1998 2007
a 
Constant  0.519         6.173         1.458         10.908***   0.867         14.971*** 
Log(x)  0.664***  0.712***         
Log(m)      0.922***  0.856***     
Log(tt)          0.902***  1.042*** 
Log(sp)  1.298***  2.495        2.066***  4.305***  1.925***  5.582*** 
Log(fi)   1.414***   0.605***   1.086***   0.243***   1.295***   0.400*** 
Neth_dum  0.188        0.227**    0.005         0.278        0.061         0.381       
R2 adj.  0.886        0.985        0.996        0.937        0.895        0.909       
Nobs  55        55        55        55        55        55       
For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. Least squares estimates with cross section 
weights. ***, (**), (*) = significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: log(distance), joint border, 1 period 
lagged log(sp), 1 period lagged log(fi), constant. a) as additional instrument log(tt( 1)) has been used. 
Source:  Own calculations.  
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Appendix F: Regression results with HP filtered data, 
The  etherlands excluded ( =45) 
Table F4:  
Instrumental variable estimates of relationships between selected wage variables and 
trade intensity measures, N = 45 
  HP_Log(RCE)  HP_Log(NCE)  HP_Log(ULC) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007 
Log(x)  0.418***  0.456***  0.400***   0.044**  0.385***  0.355       
Adj. R2  0.375        0.957        0.689        0.108        0.419        0.893       
Log(m)  0.557***  0.293***  0.594***   0.176***  0.715***  0.330       
Adj. R2  0.848        0.642        0.671        0.450        0.461        0.918       
Log(tt)  0.479***  0.434***  0.505***   0.125***  0.649***  0.406*** 
Adj. R2  0.413        0.857        0.652        0.440        0.785        0.911       
Constant term is not reported. For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. ***, (**), (*) 
= significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: the distance measure and the dummy variable indicating a 
joint border or not, the dummy for the Netherlands, constant term, one period lagged explanatory variable. 
Source:  Own calculations. 
Table F5:  
Estimates of the impact of financial integration on sector specialization (N=45, without 
The Netherlands) 
  Constant  Log(FI)  R2(adj.)  Period  Instruments 
1  3.649***  0.132***  0.504  1980 1989  OLS 
2  3.498***  0.172***  0.925  1990 1997  OLS 
3  3.594***  0.188***  0.917  1990 1997  IV: const, log(FI( 1)) 
4  3.619***  0.054***  0.414  1998 2007  OLS 
5  3.753***  0.148***  0.688  1998 2007  IV: const, log(FI( 1)) 
*** = significant at the 1% level; OLS = ordinary least squares regression; IV = instrument variable estimation. Esti 
mation with cross section weights. 
Source:  Own calculations.  
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Table F6:  
Cross section estimates of real wages, IV estimates, The Netherlands excluded 
  Dependent variable: HP_Log(RCE) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007 
Constant   0.949        8.530***   0.115        20.491***   0.788        11.283*** 
Log(x)  0.719***   0.109               
Log(m)      0.869***   0.453***     
Log(tt)          0.746***   0.195       
Log(sp)  1.518***   2.589***  1.404***   6.458***  1.479***   3.458*** 
Log(fi)   0.749***   0.066         0.387***   0.025         0.657***   0.023       
R2 adj.  0.587        0.910        0.747        0.902        0.924        0.427       
Nobs  45        45        45        45        45        45      s 
For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. Least squares estimates with cross section 
weights. ***, (**), (*) = significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: log(distance), common border, 1 
period lagged log(sp), 1 period lagged log(fi), constant. 
Source:  Own calculations. 
Table F7:  
Cross section estimates of nominal wage per employee (log(nce)), IV estimates, The Ne 
therlands excluded 
  Dependent variable: HP_Log(NCE) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007 
Constant  2.957***   0.161  2.039***   4.345***  2.873***   4.215 
Log(x)  0.583***   0.294         
Log(m)      0.919***   0.157***     
Log(tt)          0.710***   0.168 
Log(sp)  0.244**   0.371  0.823***  0.947***  0.379**  0.965 
Log(fi)   0.741***  0.048   0.432***   0064         0.642***  0.022 
R2 adj.  0.905        0.743  0.814        0.440        0.953        0.109 
Nobs  45        45  45        45        45        45 
For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. Least squares estimates with cross section 
weights. ***, (**), (*) = significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: log(distance), joint border, 1 period 
lagged log(sp), 1 period lagged log(fi), constant. 
Source:  Own calculations.  
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Table F8:  
Cross section estimates of unit labor costs (log(ulc)), IV estimates (The Netherlands ex 
cluded) 
  Dependent variable: HP_Log(ULC) 
1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997  1998 2007  1990 1997
a  1998 2007
a 
Constant  2.951**     19.311        1.801         22.343        2.186         21.104*** 
Log(x)  0.576***  0.929**           
Log(m)      0.856***  1.124***     
Log(tt)          0.803***  1.051*** 
Log(sp)  0.350        6.542        0.942***  7.946***  0.767*     7.298*** 
Log(fi)   0.955***   0.620**     0.611***   0.135         0.718***   0.443*** 
R2 adj.  0.852        0.909        0.997        0.951        0.939        0.998       
Nobs  45        45        45        45        45        45       
For a definition of the variables see appendix. N = 55 cross section units. Least squares estimates with cross section 
weights. ***, (**), (*) = significant at the 1%, (5%), (10%) level. Instruments: log(distance), joint border, 1 period 
lagged log(sp), 1 period lagged log(fi), constant. a) as additional instrument log(tt( 1)) has been used. 
Source:  Own calculations. 
 